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The past Term of the Court was one in which it swung tothe right.  A single justice, Justice Anthony Kennedy, madeall the difference—being in the majority in every five-to-
four decision that split along ideological lines.  Cases of particu-
lar interest to state-court judges held that a passenger in a rou-
tine traffic stop is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, that
California’s determinative sentencing law was unconstitutional,
and that the Court’s decision on Crawford v. Washington would
not be applied retroactively on collateral review.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court in Scott v.
Harris,1 which held that a police officer did not violate a pas-
senger’s Fourth Amendment rights by bumping his car off the
road during a high-speed chase.  The petitioner, a Georgia
police officer, joined a high-speed pursuit in progress and
received permission to “take … out” the pursued vehicle.  The
petitioner “applied his push bumper to the rear of respondent’s
vehicle,” and the respondent was paralyzed in the resulting
crash.  The respondent alleged “a violation of his federal con-
stitutional rights, viz. use of excessive force resulting in an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”  After
examining a “videotape capturing the events in question,” the
Court finds that the respondent “plac[ed] police officers and
innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury.”   To
determine the reasonableness of petitioner’s action, the Court
balances “‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the indi-
vidual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’”
After weighing the risks caused by the petitioner’s actions and
the danger that the police officer was trying to eliminate, the
Court concludes that his decision to bump the respondent’s car
was reasonable and that he is entitled to summary judgment.
In Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele,2 the Court held
that a search of the respondents’ house was reasonable despite
the fact that the respondents were of a different race than the
original suspects.  Los Angeles County deputies “obtained a
valid warrant to search a house, … unaware that the suspects
being sought had moved out three months earlier.”  Upon
entering the house at 7:00 a.m., deputies found the respon-
dents Max Rettele and Judy Sadler naked in bed and held them
at gunpoint for one to two minutes before allowing them to
dress and instructing them to wait in the living room.  Within
five minutes, the deputies realized their mistake, apologized,
and left the house.  The respondents claimed that their Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated, but the District Court
held “that the warrant was obtained by proper procedures and
the search was reasonable.”  The Ninth Circuit reversed.  The
Court rejects the Ninth Circuit’s holding because “it is not
uncommon for people of different races to live together,” so
“[w]hen the deputies ordered respondents from their bed, they
had no way of knowing whether the African-American sus-
pects were elsewhere in the house.”  The Court also notes that
“officers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and
to ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search.”
Because an armed suspect might easily hide a firearm in bed-
ding, the Court finds the officers’ orders to be reasonable under
the circumstances and concludes that the respondents’ consti-
tutional rights were not violated.
In Brendlin v. California,3 a unanimous Court held that a
routine traffic stop subjects a passenger to a Fourth
Amendment seizure in an opinion delivered by Justice Souter.
The petitioner Bruce Brendlin was riding as a passenger in a
car when it was stopped by Deputy Sheriff Robert
Brokenbough.  Deputy Brokenbough recognized the petitioner
and arrested him after verifying that he “was a parole violator
with an outstanding no-bail warrant for his arrest.”  A search
revealed several items in the car that are used to manufacture
methamphetamines. The petitioner moved at trial to suppress
the evidence against him as “fruits of an unconstitutional
seizure,” arguing that the traffic stop unlawfully seized his per-
son.  The Supreme Court of California denied the motion and
held that “a passenger ‘is not seized as a constitutional matter
in the absence of additional circumstances that would indicate
to a reasonable person that he or she was the subject of the …
officer’s investigation or show of authority.’”  The Court begins
by stating that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when an
officer, “‘by means of physical force or show of authority,’ ter-
minates or restrains [a person’s] freedom of movement.”  The
Court next cites the test established in Unites States v.
Mendenhall,4 which states that a seizure occurs if “‘in view of
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’”
The Court also notes that prior cases have repeatedly stated in
dicta “that during a traffic stop an officer seizes everyone in the
vehicle, not just the driver” and that the Court has never made
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“any distinction between driver and passenger that would
affect the Fourth Amendment.”  The Court next asks “whether
a reasonable person in Brendlin’s position when the car
stopped would have believed himself free to ‘terminate the
encounter’ between the police and himself.”  In response, the
Court reasons that a passenger “will expect to be subject to
some scrutiny” and will not feel that he or she can simply leave
during the traffic stop.  Therefore, the Court concludes that a
passenger is seized during a routine traffic stop.
SIXTH AMENDMENT
In the decision on Carey v. Musladin by Justice Thomas,5 the
Court held that a state court reasonably applied federal prece-
dent in allowing family members of a murder victim to wear
buttons with the victim’s picture on them during the murder
trial.  The respondent Mathew Musladin was convicted by a
jury of first-degree murder.  Members of the victim’s family
attended some of the trial while wearing buttons with a photo
of the victim on them, and the trial court denied a motion by
the respondent’s counsel to order the family members not to
wear the buttons.  The respondent appealed his conviction and
argued that the court’s decision to allow the buttons deprived
him of his right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment.  The
Court of Appeal concluded that under the standard established
in Holbrook v. Flynn,6 the buttons had not “branded defendant
‘with an unmistakable mark of guilt’ in the eyes of the jurors.”
The respondent filed a federal writ of habeas corpus, and the
District Court granted a certificate of appealability on the but-
tons question.  The Ninth Circuit found that the state court’s
decision failed to correctly apply Flynn and Estelle v. Williams7
and reversed.  The Court begins by noting that under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
habeas relief can be granted “if the California Court of Appeal’s
decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of” the Court’s previous holdings.  Williams involved a
defendant who was forced to wear identifiable prison clothing
during his trial.  The Court concluded that this action violated
his Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Flynn addressed the issue
of seating “‘four uniformed state troopers’” immediately
behind the defendant at trial.  The Court held that this pres-
ence did not violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial.  The
Court distinguishes Williams and Flynn from the present case
because they involved government-sponsored actions in con-
trast to the private spectators’ actions of wearing the buttons.
The Court holds that due to a lack of Supreme Court decisions
regarding private spectator’s conduct, the Ninth Circuit erred
in holding that the California Court of Appeal’s ruling was an
unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law.”
In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, a 6-3 Court in
Cunningham v. California8 held that California’s determinative
sentencing law (DSL) violated petitioner John Cunningham’s
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  The petitioner was
convicted of continuous
sexual abuse of a child
under the age of 14.  Under
the DSL, this crime requires
“a lower term sentence of 6
years, a middle term sen-
tence of 12 years, or an
upper term sentence of 16
years.”  The DSL mandates
that a trial judge sentence
the defendant to the middle
term unless he finds addi-
tional aggravating or mitigating factors by a preponderance of
the evidence at a sentencing hearing.  In the petitioner’s case,
the judge found six aggravating factors and one mitigating
factor and sentenced petitioner to the upper term sentence of
16 years.  The Court begins its review by examining the his-
tory of the DSL, which was enacted to “promote uniform and
proportionate punishment.”  The Court finds that the DSL fre-
quently uses the term “fact” and requires a preponderance of
the evidence, “a clear factfinding directive.”  The Court states
that it has consistently held that “any fact that exposes a
defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a
jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,9 the Court held that an extended
prison term was not valid when imposed because of a judge’s
finding that the crime was committed “‘with a purpose to
intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of
race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or
ethnicity.’”  The Court finds that although it should be clear
that California’s DSL violates Apprendi’s rule, it must address
the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Black10 to
the contrary.  The Black decision held that the DSL only
allows “‘the type of factfinding that traditionally has been
incident to the judge’s selection of an appropriate sentence.’”
The Court rejects this decision because the Apprendi rule
leaves “no room for such an examination” by a judge.  The
Court concludes that the DSL violates the Sixth Amendment
and notes that it is up to California to adjust its sentencing
system in light of this decision.
In Justice Breyer’s decision on Rita v. U.S.,11 an 8-1 Court
held that the Circuit Courts of Appeals may presume a sen-
tence imposed within a properly determined U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines range is reasonable.  The petitioner Victor Rita was
convicted of perjury, making false statements, and obstructing
justice.  During sentencing, the Guidelines were applied and a
sentencing range of 33-to-41 months was recommended.  The
petitioner raised two arguments for a sentence outside of the
recommended range: (1) that within the Guideline’s frame-
work his case was “atypical” and “falls outside the ‘heartland’
to which the United States Sentencing Commission intends
each individual Guideline to apply;” and (2) that “independent
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of the Guidelines, applica-
tion of the sentencing factors
set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§3553(a) … warrants a
lower sentence.”  The sen-
tencing judge entered a sen-
tence of 33 months, the
Guidelines minimum.  The
Fourth Circuit affirmed and
stated that “‘a sentence
imposed within the properly
calculated Guidelines range … is presumptively reasonable.’”
The Court begins by noting that a presumption of reasonable-
ness “is not binding” and merely reflects the “double determi-
nation” made by the sentencing judge and the Sentencing
Commission that the sentence is reasonable.  In reviewing the
legislative history of the Guidelines, the Court finds that “[t]he
Commission has made a serious, sometimes controversial,
effort to carry out [Congress’s] mandate,” reflecting the dual
goals of uniformity and proportionality, despite the fact that
they sometimes conflict.  The Court concludes that “it is fair to
assume that the Guidelines, insofar as practicable, reflect a
rough approximation of sentences that might achieve
§3553(a)’s objectives.”  The Court also relies upon U.S. v.
Booker,12 which held that a provision of the Guidelines that
made them binding on district courts was unconstitutional.
The Court finds that the Booker opinion “made clear that
today’s holding does not violate the Sixth Amendment” in stat-
ing that “‘the constitutional issues presented … would have
been avoided entirely if Congress had omitted … the provi-
sions that make the Guidelines binding on district judges.’”
The Court concludes that the petitioner’s circumstances do not
“require a sentence lower than the sentence the Guidelines
provide.”
In Whorton v. Bockting,13 a unanimous Court held that its
decision in Crawford v. Washington14 does not apply retroac-
tively to the respondent’s case.  The respondent Marvin
Bockting resided with his wife, Laura, and Laura’s daughter
from a previous relationship, Autumn.  One night Autumn told
her mother that the respondent had sexually abused her.
Laura took Autumn to a hospital where an examination of her
“revealed strong physical evidence of sexual assaults.”
Detective Charles Zinovitch interviewed Autumn while her
mother was present, and she described in detail what the
respondent had allegedly done to her.  The respondent was
arrested and indicted on four counts of sexually assaulting a
minor under 14 years of age.  At trial, Autumn was too
unnerved to testify, and the state moved to allow Laura and
“Detective Zinovitch to recount Autumn’s statements regard-
ing the sexual assaults.”  The trial court admitted the testi-
mony over the defense counsel’s objection, and the respondent
was subsequently convicted of three counts of sexual assault.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court, relying on Ohio v. Roberts.15 While the respondent’s
appeal to the Ninth Circuit was pending, the Court decided
Crawford, which overruled Roberts, and held that “‘[t]estimo-
nial statements of witnesses absent from trial’ are admissible
‘only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine [the
witness].’”  The respondent contended on appeal that under
Crawford, Autumn’s out-of-court testimony would not have
been admitted.  The Court begins by examining Teague v.
Lane,16 which states that “an old rule applies both on direct
and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable
only to cases that are still on direct review.”  The Court decides
that Crawford announces a new rule because its decision was
not dictated by precedent and was, in fact, contrary to Roberts.
Because Crawford is a new rule, it cannot apply retroactively
unless “it is a ‘“watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure”’ impli-
cating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal
proceeding.”  This requires showing: (1) that the rule is
needed to prevent “‘an “‘impermissibly large risk’”’ of an inac-
curate conviction” and (2) that the rule “‘alter[s] our under-
standing of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the
fairness of a proceeding.’”  The Court holds that the first
requirement is not satisfied because Crawford’s impact is
uncertain and not significant.  The Court also finds that
Crawford does not meet the second requirement because it
does not effect “a profound and ‘sweeping”’ change.  Therefore,
Crawford does not apply retroactively, and the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit is reversed.
CAPITAL SENTENCING
A 5-4 Court in Ayers v. Belmontes,17 upheld California’s
catchall factor (k) instruction against an Eighth Amendment
challenge.  The respondent Fernando Belmontes was convicted
of first-degree murder.  During sentencing he introduced miti-
gating evidence to demonstrate his ability to positively con-
tribute to society as a prison inmate.  The trial judge’s sentenc-
ing instructions to the jury included California’s catchall factor
(k) instruction that allows the jury to consider “‘[a]ny other
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.’”  Based on these
instructions, the respondent was sentenced to death.  The
Court begins its review by considering the previous challenges
to factor (k) in Boyde v. California18 and Brown v. Payton.19
Boyde involved a challenge to factor (k)’s ability to allow jury
consideration of mitigating evidence related to a defendant’s
background or character.  In Payton, the defendant made a
similar argument with respect to postcrime mitigating evi-
dence.  The Court rejected both challenges.  The Court distin-
guishes the present case from Payton in that the federal habeas
petition at issue was filed before the AEDPA deadline, resulting
in a less deferential standard of review.  Therefore, the relevant
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inquiry is “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the
jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that pre-
vents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.”
The Court analogizes the respondent’s mitigating evidence to
the precrime evidence in Boyde, concluding that it is well
within the range of consideration that factor (k) allows.
Furthermore, both the respondent and the prosecution dis-
cussed the evidence extensively, and it is “improbable the
jurors believed that the parties were engaging in an exercise in
futility.”  The Court concludes that it is highly unlikely that the
jury felt that it could not consider the mitigating evidence pre-
sented by the respondent regarding his future value as an
inmate.
In Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman20 and its companion case
Brewer v. Quarterman,21 a 5-4 Court held that Texas’s sentencing
instructions in capital cases did not give the jury enough oppor-
tunity to weigh the mitigating evidence presented in each case.
The petitioner Jalil Abdul-Kabir was convicted of capital mur-
der.  At his sentencing hearing, he presented “testimony from
his mother and his aunt, who described his unhappy child-
hood” and testimony from a psychologist that “sought to pro-
vide an explanation for [petitioner’s] behavior that might
reduce his moral culpability.”  The trial court denied the peti-
tioner’s request for special instructions and instead asked the
jury: (1) “Was the conduct of the defendant … committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death
of the deceased … would result?”; and (2) “Is there a probabil-
ity that the defendant … would commit criminal acts of vio-
lence that would constitute a continuing threat to society?”
Under the Texas criminal code, if the jury answers both ques-
tions affirmatively, the judge must impose a death sentence.
The jury answered in the affirmative, and Abdul-Kabir was sen-
tenced to death.  In the companion case, the petitioner Brent
Ray Brewer was convicted of murder.  He presented mitigating
evidence including a recent “bout with depression,” manipula-
tion and domination by his female co-defendant, and abuse of
drugs.  As in Abdul-Kabir’s case, a sentencing jury answered the
sentencing questions affirmatively, and Brewer was sentenced to
death.  The Court begins the Abdul-Kabir opinion by noting
that because the AEDPA applies, it must determine “whether
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ (CCA) adjudication of
[Abdul-Kabir’s] claim on the merits ‘resulted in a decision that
was contrary to … clearly established Federal law.’”  The Court
finds that its precedent clearly establishes that “sentencing
juries must be able to give meaningful consideration and effect
to all mitigating evidence that might provide a basis for refus-
ing to impose the death penalty….”  Turning to the trial court’s
decision, the Court states that the “trial judge did not analyze
[Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I)22],” but instead “relied on three later
Texas cases and on [the Court’s] opinion in Graham v.
Collins.”23 The Court finds that Graham is less relevant to
Abdul-Kabir’s case than Penry I, and the trial court’s use of this
formulation of the issue
“resulted in a decision that
was both ‘contrary to’ and
‘involved an unreasonable
application of’” the Court’s
previous decisions.  The
Court next finds that the
CCA erred in its application
of Penry I because it
“ignored the fact that even
though [Abdul-Kabir’s] mit-
igating evidence may not
have been as persuasive as
Penry’s, it was relevant …
for precisely the same rea-
son.”  The Court concludes that it is conceivable that a juror
could find “himself without a means for giving meaningful effect
to the mitigating qualities” of the presented evidence as man-
dated by Penry I. Accordingly, the judgment of the Fifth Circuit
denying Abdul-Kabir’s application for a writ of habeas corpus is
reversed, and the case remanded.  In the Brewer opinion, the
Court states that the Fifth Circuit erred in its decision, and the
decision is reversed for the reasons enumerated in the Abdul-
Kabir opinion.
In Smith v. Texas,24 a 5-4 Court held that the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals’ (CCA) requirement that the petitioner show
egregious harm was an error based “on a misunderstanding of
the federal right” that the petitioner asserted.  The petitioner
LaRoyce Lathair Smith was convicted of first-degree murder.
The sentencing phase of his trial took place between Penry v.
Lynaugh (Penry I),25 and Penry v. Johnson (Penry II).26 During
this interim period, the Texas trial court in Smith’s case
attempted to correct the special jury instructions invalidated in
Penry I by instructing the jury to “nullify the special issues if
the mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, convinced the jury
Smith did not deserve the death penalty.”  Nevertheless, the
jury answered affirmatively to the special instructions, and the
petitioner was sentenced to death.  Following this sentencing
phase, the Court held in Penry II that a similar nullification
charge was “insufficient to cure the flawed special issues.”  The
petitioner sought relief, but the CCA affirmed the denial of
relief.  The Court granted certiorari and reversed in Smith v.
Texas (Smith I).27 On remand, the CCA again denied relief,
holding that petitioner’s “pretrial objections did not preserve
the claim of constitutional error he asserts” and that under
Texas law, “this procedural default required Smith to show
egregious harm—a burden … he did not meet.”  The Court
begins by discussing the CCA’s decision.  The Court disagrees
with the CCA’s egregious-harm requirement because the basis
for reversal in Smith I was that the nullification charge did not
“[cure] the underlying Penry error” and not some separate
error based on the nullification charge itself.  The Court finds
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that the petitioner’s “central
objection at each stage has
been to the special issues”
and that this is sufficient to
preserve his claim of Penry
error as vindicated in Smith I.
Therefore, under the Texas
framework, he is only
required to show “‘some
harm’” from the CCA’s error.  The Court concludes that this
harm exists because the petitioner “has shown there was a rea-
sonable likelihood that the jury interpreted the special issues
to foreclose adequate consideration of his mitigating evi-
dence.”
In Panetti v. Quarterman,28 a 5-4 Court overturned the death
sentence of a mentally ill prisoner.  The petitioner Scott Louis
Panetti killed his wife’s parents in front of his wife and daugh-
ter.  A court-ordered psychiatric evaluation “indicated that
petitioner suffered from a fragmented personality, delusions,
and hallucinations.”  At trial, the petitioner represented him-
self, “claimed he was not guilty by reason of insanity,” and dis-
played very strange behavior.  Afterwards, a jury found him
guilty of murder and sentenced him to death.  After his execu-
tion date was set, the petitioner’s counsel filed a motion claim-
ing “for the first time, that due to mental illness he was incom-
petent to be executed.”  In state court, two court-appointed
mental-health experts evaluated the petitioner and concluded
that he “‘knows that he is to be executed, and that his execu-
tion will result in his death,’ and, moreover, that he ‘has the
ability to understand the reason he is to be executed.’”  Despite
his objections to the evaluation and proceedings, the court
held that the petitioner had not shown he was incompetent to
be executed. The petitioner “returned to federal court,” and
the District Court denied his habeas petition on the grounds
that he “had not shown incompetency as defined by Circuit
precedent.”  In the Supreme Court, the petitioner argues that
under the AEDPA, no deference is due to the state court’s judg-
ment.  The Court agrees with the petitioner because the state
court’s “failure to provide the procedures mandated by Ford v.
Wainwright,29 constituted an unreasonable application of
clearly established law.”  The Court states that the trial court
did not give the petitioner “an adequate means by which to
submit expert psychiatric evidence in response to the evidence
that had been solicited by the state court” and that this is an
unconstitutional error.  After finding that “[t]here is … much
in the record to support the conclusion that petitioner suffers
from severe delusions,” the Court turns to an examination of
the District Court’s holding that the petitioner is competent
enough to be executed because he knows that he committed
the murders, that he will be executed, and that the justification
for his execution is his commission of the murders.  The Court
concludes that the District Court was mistaken because “[i]t is
error to derive from Ford … a strict test for competency that
treats delusional beliefs as irrelevant once the prisoner is aware
the State has identified the link between his crime and the pun-
ishment to be inflicted.”
CRIMINAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A unanimous Court in Jones v. Bock30 rejected the Sixth
Circuit’s interpretation of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PLRA).  The petitioners are three inmates who filed
grievances against prison officials and officers of the Michigan
Department of Corrections.  The PLRA mandates that prison-
ers “exhaust prison grievance procedures before filling suit.”
In interpreting the PLRA, the Sixth Circuit required that proof
of exhaustion be attached to prisoner complaints and also that
the defendants “have been named from the beginning of the
grievance process.”  If both exhausted and unexhausted claims
were pleaded in a single complaint, the Sixth Circuit applied a
“total exhaustion” rule and dismissed the entire suit.  The
Court begins by addressing whether the PLRA requires
exhaustion to be pleaded in the complaint or whether it is an
affirmative defense for the defendant.  The Court finds that
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, exhaustion is usu-
ally treated as an affirmative defense and that there is nothing
explicit or implicit in the PLRA to the contrary.  The respon-
dent, however, contends that the PLRA was meant to deviate
from this traditional framework to effectively reduce the vol-
ume of frivolous prisoner lawsuits.  The Court feels that this
argument proves too much and that “the same could be said
with respect to any affirmative defense.”  The Court holds that
under the PLRA, exhaustion need not be pleaded by an inmate
in his or her complaint, and failure to exhaust is an affirmative
defense.  The Court next turns to the issue of whether inmates
must name all future defendants in their initial grievances.
Finding that “nothing in the statute imposes a ‘name all defen-
dants’ requirement,” the Court holds that “exhaustion is not
per se inadequate simply because an individual later sued is not
named in the grievances.”  Finally, the Court addresses the
Sixth Circuit’s total-exhaustion rule.  The respondents argue
that the PLRA language stating that “‘no action shall be
brought’ unless administrative procedures are exhausted” bars
an entire suit because Congress would have used the term
“claim” instead of “action” if it intended otherwise.  The Court
rejects this argument as reading too much into boilerplate lan-
guage and concludes that the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of
the PLRA is erroneous.
In James v. U. S.,31 a 5-4 Court held that attempted burglary
is a felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s
(ACCA) mandatory minimum sentencing requirement.  The
ACCA provides that any “‘person who violates section 922(g)
… and has three prior convictions … for a violent felony or a
serious drug offense’” is subject to a mandatory minimum sen-
tence of 15 years.  Section 922(g) is violated when a felon is
convicted of possession of a firearm.  A violent felony is
defined under the ACCA as “any crime punishable by impris-
onment for a term exceeding one year … that … (ii) is bur-
glary, arson, or extortion, … or otherwise involves conduct
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that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.”  The petitioner Alphonso James, a previously con-
victed felon, pleaded guilty to violating section 922(g) and had
been convicted of three previous felonies: two serious drug
convictions and one attempted burglary conviction.  At the
petitioner’s trial, the District Court concluded “that attempted
burglary is a violent felony” and applied the ACCA’s minimum
mandatory sentence.  The Court begins by noting that the only
possible way the petitioner’s attempted burglary conviction
qualifies as a violent felony is if it “‘otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.’”  The Court turns to the question of “whether
attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law, is an offense that
‘involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of phys-
ical injury to another.’”  The Court finds that the risk of bur-
glary “arises not from completion of the burglary, but from the
possibility that an innocent person might appear while the
crime is in progress” and that attempted burglary “poses the
same kind of risk.”  The Court also notes that every Court of
Appeals that has dealt with an attempted-burglary statute 
similar to Florida’s “has held that the offense qualifies as a ‘vio-
lent felony.’”  The Court concludes that attempted burglary
under the Florida law is a violent felony under ACCA’s resid-
ual provision.
In Wilkie v. Robbins,32 the Court declined to create a new
constitutional cause of action to govern the respondent’s case
and also denied his Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act’s (RICO) claim.  The respondent Frank
Robbins purchased the title to a ranch in Wyoming from
George Nelson.  Nelson had previously granted the United
States an easement to use and maintain a road on the ranch,
but the Bureau of Land Management had failed to record it.
After Bureau employees realized their mistake, they phoned
the respondent and “demanded an easement to replace
Nelson’s.”  The respondent refused, and over the next several
years, he alleges that Bureau employees “carried on a campaign
of harassment and intimidation aimed at forcing him to regrant
the lost easement.”  The respondent filed the instant suit in
1998, alleging that the petitioners violated his Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents,33 which “held that the victim of a Fourth Amendment
violation by federal officers had a claim for damages.”  The
respondent also asserts a RICO claim.  The Court begins with
a brief examination of Bivens, noting that “in most instances
we have found a Bivens remedy unjustified.”  The Court finds
that the respondent “has an administrative … process for vin-
dicating virtually all of his complaints,” but the Court notes
that this does not expressly preclude the creation of a new con-
stitutional cause of action.  The respondent alleges that while
he may have had some remedy for most of the individual inci-
dents, the Bureau’s conduct amounted to “‘death by a thousand
cuts’” and should be treated as a whole.  The Court agrees that
“[t]he whole here is greater than the sum of its parts” but feels
that respondent’s claim is essentially that the government
“went too far” and notes the
inherent difficulty of line-
drawing in such cases.
Therefore, the Court rejects
the respondent’s proposed
Bivens cause of action, find-
ing that it might “be worse
than the disease.”  RICO
makes it illegal for certain
organizations to engage in a
“‘pattern of racketeering
activity,’” including viola-
tions of the Hobbs Act.  The
Court finds that at the time the Hobbs Act was passed, the
crime of extortion dealt mostly with public corruption and not
“the harm caused by overzealous efforts to obtain property on
behalf of the Government.”  For this reason, the Court also dis-
misses the respondent’s RICO claim.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
A 5-4 Court in Lawrence v. Florida,34 held that the AEDPA’s
tolling period for state post-conviction procedures does not
continue to toll during U.S. Supreme Court certiorari petitions.
The petitioner Gary Lawrence was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death.  The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
sentence, and the Court denied certiorari on January 20, 1998.
364 days later, the petitioner filed a petition for post-convic-
tion relief and was denied.  He again petitioned the Court for
certiorari, and while this was pending, he also filed a federal
habeas application.  The Court denied certiorari on March 24,
2003.  The petitioner’s habeas claim was dismissed in the
District Court as untimely under AEDPA section 2244(d),
which contains a one-year statute of limitations for habeas
relief from the judgment of a state court.  Section 2244(d)(2)
states that this “limitations period is tolled while an ‘applica-
tion for State post-conviction or other collateral review … is
pending.’”  The District Court concluded that this period does
not toll during a petition for certiorari.  The District Court held
that the limitations period had run because the petitioner
waited 364 days before filing his petition for postconviction
relief and then an additional 113 before filing his habeas peti-
tion.  The Court begins its analysis by stating that the real issue
“is whether the limitations period was also tolled during the
pendency of Lawrence’s petition for certiorari to this Court.”
The Court feels that a natural reading of the statute’s language
only includes the state-court review process and that the Court
is clearly not part of this process.  The Court further reasons
that under the petitioner’s reading of the AEDPA, no “state
prisoner could exhaust state postconviction remedies without
filing a petition for certiorari.”  However, the Court has previ-
ously held that state procedures are exhausted “at the end of
state-court review.”  The Court concludes by noting that the
petitioner’s position would “provide incentives for state pris-
oners to file certiorari petitions as a delay tactic.”
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In Schriro v. Landrigan,35
a 5-4 Court held that the
respondent’s repeated
requests that his counsel
not present mitigating evi-
dence at his sentencing
hearing provided sufficient
reason for the District
Court to deny his habeas
petition.  The respondent
Jeffrey Landrigan was con-
victed of theft, second-
degree burglary, and felony
murder.  At sentencing, his counsel attempted to submit miti-
gating evidence in the form of testimony from the respondent’s
ex-wife and his mother, but at the respondent’s request, “both
women refused to testify.”  The respondent also interrupted
when other mitigating evidence was brought in by his counsel
and told the judge to “‘bring on’” the death penalty.  The
respondent was sentenced to death.  Citing the ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel standard set forth in Strickland v.
Washington,36 a District Court refused the respondent an evi-
dentiary hearing, finding that he could not make a “colorable
claim” because he “could not demonstrate that he was preju-
diced by any error his counsel may have made.”  The Ninth
Circuit reversed.  The Court begins by addressing the Ninth
Circuit’s application of the AEDPA.  The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the state court’s finding that the respondent
“instructed his counsel not to introduce any mitigating evi-
dence,” was an “‘unreasonable determination of the facts.’”
Reviewing the record, the Court cites several instances of the
respondent informing his counsel not to present mitigating
evidence and concludes that “the Arizona postconviciton
court’s determination of the facts was reasonable.”  The Court
finds that “[i]f Landrigan issued such an instruction, his coun-
sel’s failure to investigate further could not have been prejudi-
cial under Strickland” and “the District Court was well within
its discretion to determine that … [he] could not develop a fac-
tual record that would entitle him to habeas relief.”  The Court
concludes that the Ninth Circuit “erred in holding that the
District Court abused its discretion in declining to grant
Landrigan an evidentiary hearing.”
In Uttecht v. Brown,37 a 5-4 Court, in a decision delivered by
Justice Kennedy, held that the Ninth Circuit failed to give
proper deference to state-court determinations that a particu-
lar juror would be substantially impaired in performing his or
her juror duties.  The respondent Cal Coburn Brown was sen-
tenced to death in the State of Washington, and the
Washington Supreme Court affirmed his sentence.  He peti-
tioned a District Court for a writ of habeas corpus and was
denied.  The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that “the state
trial court had violated Brown’s Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by excusing” Juror Z on the grounds that
he “could not be impartial in deciding whether to impose a
death sentence.”  The Court begins with an examination of
Witherspoon v. Illinois,38 which held that “‘a sentence of death
cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed … it was chosen
by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced
general objections to the death penalty.’”  However, the Court
points out that Wainwright v. Witt39 adopted a looser standard
for excluding veniremen: “‘[W]hether the juror’s views would
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as
a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’”  The
Court next analyzes the voir dire in respondent’s case, finding
that Juror Z “had both serious misunderstandings about his
responsibility as a juror and an attitude toward capital punish-
ment that could have prevented him from returning a death
sentence under the facts of this case.”  The Court also notes
that with regard to the State’s challenge to Juror Z and
“[b]efore the trial court could ask [the respondent] for a
response, the defense volunteered, ‘We have no objection,’”
and Juror Z was subsequently excused.  The Court rejects the
Ninth Circuit’s holding that Juror Z was not substantially
impaired and concludes that “the trial court acted well within
its discretion in granting State’s motion to excuse Juror Z.”  In
conclusion, the Court holds that “[c]ourts reviewing claims of
Witherspoon-Witt error, … especially federal courts considering
habeas petitions, owe deference to the trial court.”
In Fry v. Pliler,40 the Court upheld the Ninth Circuit’s deter-
mination that the petitioner was required to demonstrate sub-
stantial and injurious effect from the trial court’s decision to
exclude testimony.  The petitioner John Francis Fry was con-
victed by a jury of two murders.  At trial he attempted to link
Anthony Hurtz to the homicide.  The trial court excluded the
testimony of his witness Pamela Maples, “who was prepared to
testify that she had heard Hurtz discussing homicides bearing
some resemblance to the murder of the Bells.”  On appeal, the
petitioner contended that the exclusion of Maples’s testimony
“deprived [him] of a fair opportunity to defend himself, in vio-
lation of Chambers v. Mississippi….”41 A federal magistrate
judge recommended denying habeas relief because “‘there
ha[d] been an insufficient showing that the improper exclu-
sion of the testimony … had a substantial and injurious effect
on the jury’s verdict’ under the standard set forth in” Brecht v.
Abrahamson.42 The District Court agreed with the magistrate
judge, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  The Court begins its
opinion with a discussion of the relevant standards of review
under Chapman v. California43 and Brecht. Chapman “held that
a federal constitutional error can be considered harmless only
if a court is ‘able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.’”  Brecht rejected the Chapman standard for
cases reaching the Court on collateral review and adopted the
more “forgiving” standard from Kotteakos v. U.S.44 that an error
“is harmless unless it ‘“had substantial and injurious effect or
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influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”’”  Therefore, the
question at hand is whether a federal court must apply the
Brecht standard “even if the state appellate court has not found,
as the state appellate court in Brecht had found, that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman.”
The Court finds that the Brecht decision “clearly assumed that
the Kotteakos standard would apply in virtually all §2254
cases” and concludes that the Ninth Circuit was correct to
apply Brecht.
In Bowles v. Russell,45 a 5-4 Court held that the Sixth Circuit
lacks jurisdiction over the petitioner’s habeas appeal because it
was filed after the 14-day period allowed by statute, despite a
judge’s extension of that period to 17 days.  The petitioner
Keith Bowles was convicted of murder and sentenced to 15
years to life imprisonment.  He filed a federal petition for
habeas corpus on September 5, 2002.  The District Court
denied relief on September 9, 2003, and the petitioner did not
file a timely notice of appeal.  However, on December 12, 2003,
the petitioner moved to “reopen the period during which he
could file his notice of appeal,” relying on Rule 4(a)(6), “which
allows district courts to extend the filing period for 14 days
from the day the district court grants the order to reopen….”
The District Court granted the petitioner’s motion but
extended the time period by 17 days instead of the 14 days
allowed by Rule 4(a)(6). The petitioner filed his notice 16 days
later, within the period granted by the court, but after the 14-
day period had elapsed.  Beginning its review, the Court finds
45. 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007).
that the issue at hand is whether the Sixth Circuit “lacked
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed outside the 14-day
window … but within the longer period granted by the District
Court.”  The Court states that it “has long held that the taking
of an appeal within the prescribed time is ‘mandatory and
jurisdictional’” and that “courts of appeals routinely and uni-
formly dismiss untimely appeals for lack of jurisdiction.”
Unlike more flexible court-promulgated rules, the Court finds
that under Rule 4(a)(6), “Congress specifically limited the
amount of time by which district courts can extend the notice-
of-appeal period….”  The Court concludes that the petitioner’s
failure to meet this statutory deadline deprived the Sixth
Circuit of jurisdiction and states that if a rigid rule is unfair,
“Congress may authorize courts to promulgate rules that
excuse compliance with the statutory time limits.”
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